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NOTES 
The Unanswered Questions of American Ship 
The National Labor Relations Act1 does not specifically prohibit 
an employer from temporarily locking out his employees during col-
lective bargaining negotiations.2 For many years, nevertheless, only 
lockouts used solely to avoid substantial economic loss as a result of 
union action-so-called "defensive" lockouts-were allowed.8 How-
ever, the emphasis which Congress placed on equality of bargaining 
pressure4 in enacting the Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRAG 
has caused a change in this judicial attitude. Although a few courts 
have g01;1e so far as to suggest that the lockout should be as freely 
available as the strike,6 the United States Supreme Court has been 
more cautious in defining the legal limits of the lockout. In fact, prior 
to its decision in American Ship Building v. NLRB,7 the Court had 
held only that a non-struck member of a multi-employer bargaining 
unit could lock his employees out after the union had struck one of 
the other members of the bargaining group. 8 
In American Ship the union properly notified the employer that 
it intended to seek modification of the existing collective bargaining 
agreement. After several bargaining sessions, the employer made a 
final proposal, which the union refused to submit to its membership. 
The parties separated with no date set for further. meeting. The em-
ployer notified the employees that because of the unsettled labor 
1. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964). 
2. A lockout has been defined at common law as the "cessation [by the employer] of 
the furnishing of work to employees in an effort to get for the employer more desirable 
terms." Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45, 52 (7th Cir. 1908) (con• 
curring opinion). 
The first draft of the NLRA (Wagner Act) included a provision making the lockout 
illegal. S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d.Sess. § 5(2) (1935), However, this provision did not appear 
in the act as enacted. · 
3. See, e.g., NLRB v. Long Lake Lumber Co., 138 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1943) (lockout 
to combat unionization not allowed); Atlas Underwear Co. v. NLRB, 116 F.2d 1020 (6th 
Cir. 1941) (lockout to avoid shutdown of plant by "mob takeover" allowed); NLRB v. 
National Motor Bearing Co., 105 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1939) (lockout motivated by inefli• 
cient operations not allowed); Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1943) (lockout 
to avert spoilage allowed); Isaac Schieber, 26 N.L.R.B. 937 (1940) (lockout to evade con-
tract obligation not allowed); Link-Belt Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 227 (1940) (lockout to prevent 
seizure of a plant by sit-down strikes allowed); Lengell-Pencil Co., 8 N.L.R.B, 988 (1938) 
(lockout to break bargaining impasse not allowed). 
4. See 93 CONG. REc. 4436, 4580 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft); 93 CONG. R.Ec. 4135 
(1947) (remarks of Senator Ellender). 
5. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1964). 
6. See, e.g., NLRB v. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp., 301 F.2d 886 {5th Cir. 1962): Morand 
Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1951). 
7. 380 U.S. 300 (1965). 
8. NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87 (1957) (Buffalo Linen). In this decision 
the Court resolved a conflict among the circuits. Compare Morand Bros. Beverage Co. 
v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1951), and Leonard v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 
1952), with Truck Drivers Union v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1956). 
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dispute they were laid off until further notice. Negotiations resumed, 
and two months later an agreement was reached. The union subse-
quently filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board 
charging that the employer had violated sections S(a)(I) and (3) of 
the National Labor Relations Act.9 The NLRB found that the em-
ployer. had committed the alleged unfair labor practices, since the 
lockout was utilized solely to bring bargaining pressure on the 
union.10 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
affirmed the Board's decision.11 The Supreme Court reversed, hold-
ing that an employer does not violate the NLRA when he temporarily 
shuts down his plant and locks out his employees if (1) a bargaining 
impasse has been reached and (2) the employer's sole purpose is to 
bring economic pressure to bear on the union.12 
Since the bargaining lockout in American Ship might have been 
upheld as a "defensive lockout,"13 the Supreme Court's recognition 
of the right of a single employer to lock out under specified con-
ditions without proving economic justification represents a signifi-
cant labor-law development.14 However, of equal or perhaps greater 
significance are the questions which the Court specifically left un-
answered in its decision; their resolution will determine whether 
the lockout is likely to become an important bargaining weapon for 
employers. 
The first of these questions relates to the legality of other bargain-
ing lockouts which do not comply with the limitations specified in 
American Ship. In this regard, the Court itself indicated that this 
determination must be made by further analysis of sections S(a)(l) 
and (3).15 Section 8(a)(3) prohibits an employer from encouraging 
or discouraging' union membership by discriminating against em-
ployees in regard to tenure or terms of employment.16 Although a 
violation of this section generally requires a finding of anti-union 
9. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964), states in pertinent part: 
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(!) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the 
rights guaranteed in section 7; ••• 
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term 
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any 
labor organization • . • • -
NLRA § 7, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964), states in part: 
"Employees shall have the right to self organization, ••. to bargain collectively, ••• 
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of ••• mutual aid or pro-
tection .••• " 
10. American Ship Building Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1362 (1963). 
11. Local 374, International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 
1964). 
12. 380 U.S. at 318. 
13. See id. at 327 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
14. The Court had specifically declined to co}lsider this issue in NLRB v. Truck 
Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87, 93 (1957). 
15. 380 U.S. at 315. 
16. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 73 Stat. 525 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964). 
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motivation on the part of the employer,17 some employer activities 
are deemed to be so "inherently prejudicial and devoid of economic 
justification" that no anti-union animus need be shown.18 The Court 
ruled that the bargaining lockout in American Ship was not inher-
ently prejudicial,19 and further stated that a lockout does not violate 
section 8(a)(3) if it is used for "the sole purpose of bringing economic 
pressure to bear in support of [the employer's] ... bargaining posi-
tion."20 However, since any evidence of hostile intent wholly im-
peaches othenvise legal activity under section 8(a)(3),21 it appears 
that this "sole purpose" language pinpoints one definite limitation 
on the use of a bargaining lockout. Thus, an employer who locks out 
for anti-union reasons commits an unfair labor practice. 
Section S(a)(l) prohibits employers' interference with or coercion 
of the right of employees to bargain collectively.22 Although the 
Court's holding in American Ship applied only to a bargaining lock-
out employed after an impasse,23 it appears that a pre-impasse lockout 
may be equally immune to attack under section S(a)(l). Undoubt-
edly, such a lockout would place substantial bargaining pressure on 
the union. However, this pressure will affect only the ultimate terms of 
the bargaining agreement and not the employees' right to bargain. 
17. See 380 U.S. at 311; Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 43 (1954); NLRB 
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 46 (1938). 
18. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 229 (1963); Radio Officers Union 
v. NLRB, supra note 17, at 44-45. 
19. 380 U.S. at 312. 
20. Id. at 318. (Emphasis added.) 
21. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 227 (1963); Associated Press v. 
NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937). 
22. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l) (1964). This section prohibits interfer• 
ence with or coercion of employees' rights guaranteed in § 7 of the NLRA, which in-
_clude the right to bargain collectively. For the relevant text of §§ 7 and 8(a)(l), see note 
9 supra. 
23. 380 U.S. at 318. In addition to holding that the employer had not interfered 
with the employees' right to bargain collectively, the Court ruled that a lockout within 
the imposed limitations does not interfere with the right to strike. This right is a 
protected "concerted activity" under § 7 of the NLRA; thus, an employer who inter• 
feres with that right violates § 8(a)(l). Division 1287, Amalgamated Ass'n of Street 
Workers v. Missouri, 374 U.S. 74, rehearing denied, 375 U.S. 870 (1963). However, in 
order to protect the employer's interests the Supreme Court has upheld certain practices 
which admittedly interfere with the employees' right to strike. The Court stated in 
NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957), that the right to strike "is not 
so absolute as to deny self-help by employers when legitimate interests of employees 
and employers collide.'' The function of the NLRB is to balance these competing in• 
terests. See, e.g., NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963); Republic Aviation 
Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945). In American Ship, the Supreme Court established 
as a matter of law that the employer's right to use the lockout as a bargaining weapon 
outweighs the infringement on the employees' right to strike. Such a holding removes 
from the NLRB the function of balancing interests in this situation. This result would 
not be altered even if the lockout were allowed before an impasse. The Court stated 
that a mere interference with the timing of the strike would not constitute an interfcr• 
ence with the right to strike. Since unions may strike before an impasse is reached, the 
interference with the timing of the strike is the same whether the lockout occurs before 
or after an impasse. 
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As long as there is no deterioration of the union's capacity for· effec-
tive and responsible representation,24 the right to bargain collec-
tively is impaired to no greater extent by a lockout employed before 
an impasse than by one used after an impasse. 
Nevertheless, a pre-impasse lockout may constitute a violation of 
the employer's duty to bargain in good faith in compliance with 
section 8(a)(5).25 An employer's use of an economic weapon after an 
impasse cannot violate section 8(a)(5), since an impasse is by de:fi.-
nition a stalemate after the parties have bargained in good faith.26 
It does not necessarily follow, however, that the same weapon is legal 
when employed before an impasse. Although the Supreme Court did 
not consider section 8(a)(5) in American Ship,21 it had previously 
held in NLRB v. Katz28 that the unilateral imposition of terms-a 
permissible weapon when used after an impasse29-violated the em-
ployer's duty to bargain in good faith when invoked before an impasse 
had been reached,30 even though bargaining continued and there was 
no showing of subjective bad faith.31 It would seem possible to make 
a similar distinction between pre-impasse and post-impasse bargain-
ing lockouts, since the employer in effect unilaterally changes the 
terms of employment by denying his employees the right to work. 
However, denial of the right to work is far different from the types 
of changed exµployment conditions unilaterally imposed in Katz 
before an impasse had been reached. The conditions in Katz related 
to sick leave, wage increases, and merit increases, and had all been the 
subject of bargaining immediately preceding the unilateral change. 
The Court found that these changes indicated a lack of good faith 
during bargaining tantamount to a refusal to negotiate, 32 but stated 
that unilateral action is not illegal if it merely places pressure on 
the other party in support of genuine negotiations without foreclosing 
discussion on any issue.33 Thus, bargaining lockouts should fall within 
this exception to the Katz rule if the pressure itself is not unduly 
coercive. • 
A second factor which might support the legality of a pre-impasse 
24. See 380 U.S. at l!09. 
25. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964). 
26. NLRB v. United Clay Mines Corp., 219 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1955). 
27. "Although the complaint in American Ship stated a violation of § 8(a)(5), ••• the 
NLRB made no findings as to this claim, believing that there would have been no 
point in entering a bargaining order because the parties had long since executed an 
agreement." 380 U.S. at l!06 n.5. 
28. l!69 U.S. 71!6 (1962). 
29. See, e.g., NLRB v. Tex-Tan, Inc., 818 F.2d 472, 479 (5th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. 
Katz, supra note 28 (dictum). 
30. NLRB v. Katz, 869 U.S. 736, 747 (1962). 
81. Ibid. 
82. Id. at 746; cf. NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 337 U.S. 217 (1949). 
83. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747 (1962); accord, NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l 
Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960). 
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bargaining lockout is the close similarity between the economic pres-
sure exerted by a lockout and that exerted by a strike. Since the 
union's duty to bargain in good faith,34 which is analogous to the 
duty placed on the employer under section 8(a)(5), does not prevent 
the calling of a strike before an impasse has been reached,B5 it does 
not appear that section 8(a)(5) should limit the use of the lockout 
in this respect. Indeed, since the Taft-Hartley amendments to the 
NLRA were apparently intended to equalize the bargaining position 
of the employers and the unions,36 a pre-impasse bargaining lockout 
should be legal if the employer does continue to bargain in good 
faith. 
The recent decision by the Supreme Court in Teamsters Local 
No. 372 v. Detroit Newspaper Publishers' Ass'nB1 would seem to 
indicate that no definite statement by the Court on the legality of 
a pre-impasse bargaining lockout will be forthcoming until the 
NLRB, and subsequently the circuit courts, have indicated their 
respective views. In that case, one of the two major newspapers in 
Detroit locked out its employees after the other had been struck. 
The two had not formed a multi-employer bargaining unit, but had 
merely made an agreement between themselves that one paper would 
hold out on certain contract terms if the other would lock out its 
employees after a strike against the first. Thus, the lockout must be 
treated as a single-employer bargaining lockout before an impasse. 
The NLRB ruled, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Ameri-
can Ship, that the lockout constituted an unfair labor practice.BB 
While the case was on review before the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit, the Board asked the court to remand it for reconsider-
ation in light of the American Ship decision. Instead, the court over-
ruled the Board's order, stating that American Ship indicated that 
the Supreme Court would allow a pre-impasse lockout.Bo The Su-
preme Court, however, vacated the decision of the circuit court and 
remanded the case to the NLRB for further consideration.40 Thus, 
it appears that the Court, recognizing that the circuit courts will 
disagree on the legality of such a lockout,41 wishes the Board to make 
34. NLRA § 8(b)(3), 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1964). 
35. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960); Mine Workers 
v. NLRB, 257 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1958). 
36. See note 4 supra and accompanying text. 
37. 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3244 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1966). 
38. Evening News Ass'n, 145 N.L.R.B. 996 (1964). 
39. Detroit Newspaper Publishers' Ass'n v. NLRB, 346 F.2d 52'7 (6th Cir. 1965), 
40. Teamsters Local No. 372 v. Detroit Newspaper Publishers' Ass'n, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 
3244 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1966). 
41. Several other cases involving questions relevant to American Ship have already 
reached the courts. When the facts have been within the limits of American Ship, the 
courts have simply overruled the Board. See NLRB v. Golden State Bottling Co., 52 
CCH Lab. Cas. 1116780 (9th Cir. Dec. 2, 1965); Body &: Tank Corp. v. NLRB, 344 F.2d 
330 (2d Cir. 1965). If the issue is unsettled, however, most courts have remanded the 
March 1966] Notes 915 
an initial determination without any compulsion that might stem 
from the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 
A second important question raised, but left unanswered,42 in 
American Ship relates to the legality of hiring replacements after a 
permissible bargaining lockout. Since an employer usually must, 
for financial reasons, maintain operations during a labor dispute, 
it is unlikely that he will utilize any bargaining lockout unless he 
can hire replacements for those employees whom he has locked out. 
Rather, he ·will wait for a strike and then hire replacements, as he 
generally had to do prior to American Ship. Only when a sudden 
strike would cause him severe economic loss through spoilage, freez-
ing of in-process inventories, or loss of good will through the in-
ability to perform a contract-situations in which a lockout was 
legal even before American Ship43-would he be likely to employ 
a lockout by itself. Thus, unless the hiring of replacements is a per-
missible ancillary tactic, the uses of the bargaining lockout will be 
essentially theoretical. · 
At first glance, the doctrine enunciated in NLRB v. Mackay Radio 
& Tel. Co.,44 which allows an employer to hire permanent or tempo-
rary replacements for striking employees, would appear to settle the 
issue. At least some bargaining lockouts are, like the strike, legal 
economic weapons; therefore hiring replacements for the locked-out 
employees might also seem to be legal. It would appear, however, 
that the hiring of permanent replacements for locked-out employees 
would constitute a violation of section 8(a)(3). Since striking employ-
ees desiring reinstatement must be accommodated when permanent 
replacements are being hired,45 locked-out employees would appear 
to enjoy the same right. By initiating the work stoppage, therefore, 
an employer can force employees to choose between supporting the 
union position and losing their jobs. Although the same choice must 
be made after a strike, the employees themselves have taken the 
initial action; they have accepted the risk of being permanently re-
placed. Thus, hiring permanent replacements after any bargaining 
cases to the NLRB for consideration in light of American Ship. See NLRB v. American 
Stores Packing Co., 51 CCH Lab. Cas. 1J 19578 (10th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Tonkin Corp., 
352 F.2d 509 (9th Cir: 1965). 
Prior to American Ship the circuit courts disagreed on the legality of a pre-impasse 
bargaining lockout. Compare NLRB v. Dalton Brick &: Tile Corp., 301 F.2d 886 (5th 
Cir. 1962), and Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1951), with 
Quaker State Oil Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 270 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1959), and Utah Plumbing &: 
Heating Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 294 F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1961). 
42. 300 U.S. at 308 n.8. 
43. See, e.g., NLRB v. Great Atl. &: Pac. Tea Co., 340 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965); Pepsi 
Cola Bottling Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 785 (1964); Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48 N.L.R.B. 1335 
(1943). 
44. 304 U.S. 333 (1988). 
45. See NLRB v. Shenandoah-Dives Mining Co., 145 F.2d 542, 547 (10th Cir. 1944); 
Firth Carpet Co. v. NLRB, 129 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1942). 
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lockout is inherently detrimental to employee rights, and, indeed, 
probably amounts to a de facto discharge for union affiliation. Re-
gardless of which theory is followed, the result is a violation by the 
employer of section 8(a)(3).46 
Although an employer who locks out his employees apparently 
cannot hire permanent replacements, it should not be concluded 
that he cannot hire temporary replacements. In NLRB v. Brown,41 
a companion case to American Ship, the Supreme Court held that 
non-struck members of a multi-employer bargaining unit could hire 
temporary replacements after locking out their employees. While 
it does not follow directly from this decision that a single employer 
can hire temporary replacements after a bargaining lockout,48 there 
are strong indications in both Brown and American Ship that the 
Court will sustain the hiring of temporary replacements, at least 
when the lockout is employed after an impasse. 
As with the hiring of permanent replacements, section 8(a)(3) 
appears to be the only barrier to the hiring of temporary replace-
ments after an impasse. Unless there is anti-union motivation,40 a 
violation of this section would occur only if hiring temporary replace-
ments is "inherently detrimental to employees' rights.'' 60 In Brown 
the Court said: "In the circumstances of this case, we do not see how 
the continued operations of the [conipany] ... and their use of tem-
porary replacements imply hostile motivation any more than the lock-
out itself: nor do we see how they are inherently more destructive of 
employee rights.''51 Although the "circumstances" referred to in 
Brown are not the same as those in American Ship, the Court found 
in each case that the lockouts were utilized for legitimate purposes. 
In addition, the effect on the locked-out employees was the same. 
Hence, if hiring temporary replacements was not inherently detri-
mental in Brown, it should not be inherently detrimental in a situ-
ation like that presented in American Ship. Furthermore, it should 
be noted that the Brown and American Ship cases seem to indicate 
46. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963); Radio Officers Union v. 
NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954); Valley Transit Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 658 (1963). 
47. 380 U.S. 278 (1965). 
48. In part the rationale of the Brown decision was preservation of the parity in the 
multi-employer bargaining unit. Previously, the Court had held that non-struck mem• 
bers of the bargaining group could utilize the lockout to insulate themselves from the 
effect of whip-saw strikes. NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87 (1956). Since the 
employer who had been struck could hire replacements, NLRB v. Mackay Radio & 
Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938), the employers who had locked out their employees were 
allowed to hire temporary replacements to avoid being faced with the choice of rein-
stating their employees or remaining at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis the em• 
ployer actually struck. In addition, if employers had been forced to reinstate the locked-
out employees, they would have become vulnerable to whipsaw strikes. Thus, in order 
to maintain the effectiveness of the bargaining unit. the Court felt that parity between 
the members must be preserved. 
49. See cases cited note 17 supra. 
50. See cases cited note 18 supra. 
51. 380 U.S. 278, 284 (1965). 
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a definite predisposition on the part of the Court toward increased 
use of the lockout as an economic weapon. As previously indicated, 
however, an employer will have little incentive to employ a lockout 
as a bargaining weapon unless he has the concomitant power to hire 
replacements. Thus, if the Court continues to make the issue tum 
on the employer's motive, it will sanction the hiring of temporary 
replacements for employees locked out after an impasse. 
The ability to hire temporary replacements after a pre-impasse 
lockout, on the other hand, may be limited by the NLRA. In the first 
place, if temporary replacements are hired, the terms and conditions 
of employment must be identical to those in effect before the lock-
out; any ch;mge in the terms would, under the Katz reasoning, vio-
late section 8(a)(5).52 Although a simple refusal to rehire the locked-
out employees is not a violation of section 8(a)(5),58 it may violate 
section 8(a)(3). Since an employer hiring temporary replacements 
after a strike must consider strikers who apply for reinstatement,54 
an employer hiring replacements after a lockout would seemingly 
be bound by the same requirement. If he ignores the locked-out 
employees, he discriminates against them in violation of section 
8(a)(3). After a post-impasse lockout, the employer has no need to 
discriminate, since the Katz reasoning allows him to hire any worker 
on his 01vn terms.55 After a pre-impasse lockout, however, the em-
ployer is not likely to rehire his former employees on the same terms, 
for this would amount to a pro tanto withdrawal of the lockout. 
Thus, the employer's ability to hire replacements after a pre-impasse 
lockout and still maintain any bargaining pressure is effectively pre-
cluded by section 8(a)(3). 
Furthermore, hiring temporary replacements after a pre-impasse 
lockout may violate section 8(a)(l) on the ground that it interferes 
with the employees' rights to strike and to bargain collectively. Al-
though the pre-impasse lockout, like any bargaining lockout, inter-
feres with the right to strike by depriving the union of the ability to 
time the work stoppage, it does not constitute sufficient infringement 
of that right to constitute an unfair labor practice;56 the economic 
pressure placed OIJ. the parties is the same as that created by a strike. 
In addition, a pre-impasse lockout by itself does not violate the right 
to bargain collectively. 57 When replacements are hired, however, the 
relative economic forces change drastically, since the employer is no 
longer under any pressure to settle. Whether this practice violates 
section 8(a)(l) must be determined by balancing the employer's in-
52. See notes 28-33 supra and accompanying text. 
53. Ibid. 
54. See NLRB v. Shenandoah-Dives Mining Co., 145 F.2d 542, 547 (10th Cir. 1944); 
Firth Carpet Co. v. NLRB, 129 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1942). . 
55. See notes 28-30 supra and accompanying text. 
56. See note 23 supra. 
57. See notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text. 
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terest with the degree of infringement upon the employees' rights.~8 
If replacements are hired after a strike, for example, the employer's 
interest in maintaining his operations justifies the infringement of 
the employees' rights.59 On the other hand, the employer's interest in 
attracting these replacements is not so compelling that he may offer 
them super-seniority.60 Applying this balancing test to the pre-im-
passe lockout situation, it appears that the employer's interest in hir-
ing replacements after a pre-impasse lockout would generally not be 
sufficient to overcome the interference with the employees' rights. 
The employer would not be significantly prejudiced by waiting until 
an impasse before locking out and hiring replacements. The only 
situation in which an employer's interest might justify the hiring of 
these replacements would occur when the employer faces a potential 
loss if he waits to lock out.61 This type of a lockout, however, would 
be the defensive lockout permissible before American Ship, and not 
a bargaining lockout. Hence, it appears that the hiring of replace-
ments after any pre-impasse bargaining lockout is illegal. 
Although it might seem that the decision in American Ship will 
increase the number of lockouts actually utilized by employers, an 
examination of some of the unanswered questions in the decision 
suggests that this conclusion may be erroneous. In the first place, em• 
ployers are not likely to lock out after an impasse unless they can 
hire replacements. 62 Second, even if the hiring of replacements is 
permissible, employers may never have the opportunity to lock out; 
unless the employer can also lock out before an impasse, the union 
, can defeat the employer by calling a strike first. Third, although the 
pre-impasse lockout itself may not be an unfair labor practice, there 
is considerable doubt as to the legality of hiring temporary replace-
ments at that time. Consequently, an employer generally would not 
utilize the pre-impasse lockout. Fourth, since the legality of employer 
action in any one of these situations appears to depend on whether 
an impasse has been reached, the employer may be reluctant to lock 
out and run the risk of unfair labor practice charges because no 
impasse was in fact reached. Thus, there may be few lockouts as a 
result of American Ship or its logical extension. In any case, it 
is quite clear that the critical issue in future decisions, absent any 
showing of anti-union motivation, will be whether an impasse was 
reached before the employer locked out or hired replacements. 
58. NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1956); Republic Aviation Corp. 
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